The term "good governance" is unsettled in its meaning. Through the 1980s and 1990s, donor countries and institutions trended to make aid conditional upon reforms in the recipient country, which was found largely ineffective in encouraging real policy changes. More recently, donors, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States, are increasingly insisting upon performance and good governance as a prerequisite for aid, a practice called "selectivity." This is a means of requiring a recipient state to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to economic and social reforms. There are no objective standards for determining good governance: some aspects include political stability, the rule of law, control of corruption, and accountability. High levels of poverty and weak governance are linked, making selectivity difficult to implement. For reforms to succeed, domestic support, ownership, and commitment are crucial, as are the recipient's cultural context and history.
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In the debate surrounding the issues of debt forgiveness and increases in aid, experts, policy makers, and long-time observers stressed the need for governance reform and policy prescriptions to ensure transparency and rule of law, accountability in public finances, improvement in governance standards, and creation of a productive private sector (Bhagwati and Gambari 2005; Blitz 2005; Oppenheimer 2005; Wolf 2005) .
To spend the new aid productively, suggestions were made to increase aid beyond its current levels to countries with "good governance" (Bhagwati and Gambari 2005) and to give debt relief only to countries "with good performance and tolerable political accountability" (Wolf 2005) . Accordingly, Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala announced two initiatives to be taken by the Nigerian government: (1) Nigeria will establish a monitoring system to ensure that savings to the country of $1 billion a year in a debt deal it has reached to settle $30 billion it owes to its creditors, members of the Paris Club countries, will be earmarked for health, education, agriculture, and power and water supply; and (2) the government of Nigeria will send to the National Assembly a draft Fiscal Responsibility Bill requiring greater accountability in the management of government finances (White and Mahtani 2005) .
Economist Jagdish Bhagwati and UN Under Secretary General and Special Advisor for Africa Ibrahim Gambari responded to those calling for debt relief only to those countries with good governance:
Debt relief for the very poor nations makes sense. It should be extended regardless of bad governance. Would you collect a pound of flesh from a dictator if the flesh is actually going to come from his emaciated and oppressed subjects? (Bhagwati and Gambari 2005) As there is no consensus on the criteria for measuring good governance, however, the term remains ambiguous and hence imprecision results. Should eco-nomic performance be the sole or a primary measuring rod, or should the term be extended to encompass the governance of political entities, be they central or state governments or even municipalities? What is the political content of good governance? Are liberal, democratic values included as an element of that content, and, if so, how important are they? What kind of participation in decision making is envisaged and by whom? What kind of accountability is required? How universal are or should be the standards used to evaluate good governance?
This article will provide a historical context in the next section, which will be followed by examining the World Bank's and the International Monetary Fund's approaches to governance in developing states that are recipients of aid from these international financial institutions (IFIs). The sections following will comprise a review of a donor country's-the United States's-approach to the issue of governance and a few concluding remarks, respectively.
Historical Context
Prior conditions on countries seeking debt relief and financial help in the form of loans and development aid are not new. Several decades ago, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank instituted structural adjustment programs imposing specific conditions upon a country suffering from economic malaise caused by balance of payments deficits, high inflation, and sluggish GDP, and seeking financial help to meet those challenges. Initial short-term measures prescribed by the IFIs were usually aimed at ensuring fiscal and monetary discipline. These include curtailing of spending and austerity measures, devaluation, trade liberalization, market-oriented policies and privatization, and incentives for private savings and investments. Long-term measures have included restructuring the role of the state aimed at market allocation of resources. This typically resulted in erosion of the state's role for public action and the substitution of the private sector for state involvement in the economy. Voluminous literature exists on the socioeconomic and political impacts of the austerity measures and other Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) prescribed by the IFIs for, and their implementation in, many developing countries since the 1980s, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Crisp and Kelly 1999; Hilson 2004; Devarajan, Dollar, and Holgren 2001; Dollar and Svensson 1998; Donkor 1997; Gwin and Nelson 1997; International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2001a , 2001b IMF and World Bank 2001; Reed 1996; Stokke 1995; World Bank 1998) . Hence, I will not discuss these issues further, except to note briefly one such program that researchers have studied extensively: mining sector reform in Ghana.
Policy formulations in Ghana, prescribed by the IMF and implemented with the active involvement of the government since 1983, have resulted in the country's achieving continuous economic growth and macroeconomic gains. However, Ghana continues to face enormous socioeconomic problems as well. The suffering of the poor and the impoverished is exacerbated as these people have been experiencing further marginalization, large displacements of the population have THE "GOOD GOVERNANCE" CONCEPT REVISITED occurred, a substantial portion of the mineral economy of the country is owned by foreign multinationals, and there has occurred unabated mine pollution and contamination of the fresh water resources (Hilson 2004) . Thus, the SAP in Ghana has been a mixed blessing.
The World Bank and Good Governance As a condition for lending development assistance, the Bank requires the recipient government to show effective performance and to promote further reforms. The rationale is that with good governance-that is, combating corruption, nepotism, bureaucracy, and mismanagement-and transparency, accountability, and proper procedures, aid would be effectively used to achieve the objective of reducing poverty (Doornbos 1995) . Traditionally, the Bank has not considered political issues in determining whether to undertake aid programs in the recipient state, for under their traditional mandates, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are to remain apolitical, not involved in considering governance issues. The World Bank's core mandate under its Articles of Agreement does not encompass governance reform unrelated to its economic growth agenda. As the Bank's general counsel Ibrahim Shihata (1991, 88-91) stated, the Bank can promote legal and civil service reform and transparency and accountability in budgetary discipline and fiscal management in pursuance of that agenda.
Public sector reform aimed at efficiency and economic growth remained the Bank policy and practice until a shift took place in the 1990s following a 1989 Bank report that blamed a "crisis of governance" in Sub-Saharan African for a lack of effective use of development aid in the region (World Bank 1989) . A World Bank Staff Paper in 1991 identified external agencies as "potentially key political players capable of exerting considerable influence in promoting good or bad governance. In raising the shortcomings of a country's governance, external agencies are calling into question its government's performance" (Landell-Mills and Serageldin 1991, 13) .
Thus, good governance appeared on the World Bank's agenda; one of the themes of the Bank's 1991 Annual Development Economic Conference was "Good Governance" (World Bank 1992b). On the relationship between development and governance, the Bank conceptualized governance to indicate the manner in which power and authority are exercised for development "in the management of a country's economic and social resources" (World Bank 1992a, 1). Also, as former chief economist of the Bank Joseph Stiglitz acknowledged in 1999, a shift toward "broader objectives, entitling more instruments, than was the case earlier," occurred with a change of views about development in the World Bank as well as in the development community (p. F587).
A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) discussion paper suggested that the new mandate regarding governance "arrived at a moment when growing doubts regarding the purpose and effectiveness of the IFIs seemed to threaten their funding, and even their continued existence" (Kapur and Webb 2000, 18) . Since the early 1990s, the Bank has actively engaged in governance-related programs and projects. To illustrate, between 1996 and 2000, the Bank initiated significant governance reform in the public sector in at least fifty countries, while its governance-related initiatives numbered more than six hundred in ninety-five countries (Development Committee 2000).
The World Bank's emphasis has been on the economic dimensions of good governance and the state's capacity to effectively use the development assistance.
Although the Bank presents the broader objectives mentioned by Stiglitz (1999) in economic terms, they cannot be separated from political aspects. As an illustration, the Bank, acting as the secretariat for a consortium of several donor countries that set political conditions for providing aid, conveyed those conditions to the aid recipient countries and monitored their implementation as well (Gibbon 1993, 55-56) . And the Bank's governance discourse reflects the tension between economic and political aspects of governance without at the same time providing precise criteria by which to define good governance and thus to evaluate a recipient country for the appropriate conditions for allocation of aid. As a starting point for the discussion here, a comment from the authors of the Bank's Staff Paper is appropriate:
Governance may be taken as denoting how people are ruled and how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated. It refers to a nation's system of politics and how this functions in relation to public administration and law. Thus, the concept of governance goes beyond that of "government" to include a political dimension. (Landell-Mills and Serageldin 1992, 304) With the focus on the structures of the state and its institutions as they relate to public administration and law, the Bank as the external agency prescribes these conditions purportedly to ensure transparency, accountability, and good management practices. Doornbos (2004, 377) postulated that given the World Bank's orientation, one of the key aims of the Bank's designing a good governance approach "appears to have been the creation, in developing country contexts, of state-market relationships that have been characteristic for Western neo-liberal systems." He found the end of the cold war to have been a propitious time for the Bank to open the door for imposing internally directed political conditionalities. These are to be contrasted with externally directed conditionalities that do not address internal THE "GOOD GOVERNANCE" CONCEPT REVISITED state structures. Internally directed conditionalities, on the other hand, address the structuring and operation of the aid recipient country's institutions, and are aimed at rolling back the state systems-unwieldy structures and operations of state institutions-of many developing countries (ibid.).
The World Bank's emphasis has been on the economic dimensions of good governance and the state's capacity to effectively use the development assistance. It also continued to reiterate its apolitical approach to governance reform in the allocation of development aid by focusing on efficiency in public administration, rule of law, and transparency and accountability notions of governance as the major elements to ensure economic growth and development. Consequently, it did not explicitly question how legitimate the government and its power structures are, what the decision-making process is, how public policy is formulated and implemented, or how equitable the economic system is. In its 1997 Development Report, however, the Bank did refer to citizen participation and the role of the state as pertinent governance factors having a bearing on development (Martinussen 1998) .
After a few years' experience with implementing the good governance agenda, it became apparent to the Bank that sociocultural and political contexts in the recipient countries and not the Western donors' preferences primarily shape the agenda. Although the recipient governments paid lip service to conditionalities for promoting transparency and political reform, little change in fact occurred because of resistance from entrenched socioeconomic and political interests (Bayart 1993; Harrison 1999; Doornbos 2004, 380-382) . Democracy, multipartyism, and prescribed changes in aid-receiving countries' policy structures and processes are cases in point (Doornbos 2004) .
Acknowledging that conditionalities have failed to induce reforms and good governance in the recipient countries, the World Bank and the donors have increasingly shifted their focus from conditionality to selectivity in allocating aid. A 1998 World Bank report assessing aid stated that the governments better able to use aid are those with good economic performance (World Bank 1998). The report thus recommended that aid be linked with performance and targeted to countries with effective institutions and sound policies. Subsequently, David Dollar, the main author of the Bank report, collaborating with other Bank researchers, conducted a case study of ten Sub-Saharan African countries and reaffirmed his earlier finding that conditionalities had not succeeded in inducing policy changes (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holgren 2001) . Another World Bank study likewise posited that since "corruption can significantly impair aid effectiveness," the Bank has learned to allocate aid taking into account corruption in the recipient country (Collier and Dollar 2001, 21) .
Consequently, the World Bank and several donor countries have shifted their focus from attempting to induce good governance in a recipient country by providing aid and attaching political conditionalities to requiring performance and good governance as a prerequisite from a recipient government. To illustrate, Anne Krueger, a former Bank vice president who subsequently became IMF's deputy managing director, said that the Bank "will need to differentiate carefully between countries where reforms are serious and stand a reasonable prospect of success and those in which window dressing is used as a means of seeking additional funding" (Krueger 1998 (Krueger , 2009 Another recent apt example is the Norwegian ambassador's announcement in July 2005 that Norway had suspended $4 million in aid to the Ugandan government for its "mishandling the transition to multiparty democracy, stifling opposition parties, failing to combat corruption and abusing human rights." The President of Uganda's spokesman called the move "unfair" ("Norway Freezes Aid to Press Government" 2005) . A critic of this policy, Jan Pronk (2001, 626) , has observed, "Policy improvement and better governance should not be seen as preconditions for development aid, but also as development objectives themselves." Also, as there is no consensus about the contents of good governance, and hence no universally accepted objective standards to decide what government, political, and administrative practices qualify as good governance, there is validity to the criticism that the allocation of aid might be made on political grounds and simply justified under the rubric of good governance (Doornbos 2004, 385) .
Graham Harrison (2005, 240) asserted that although the World Bank shows primary concern with economic efficiency, economic growth, and administrative reforms, its governance agenda is "subject to political and ideological influence and how governance reform can have a variety of effects on power relations." This assertion is based on prior analysis by several observers (Harriss 2002; Marquette 2001; Nelson 1995) . After extensively studying the Bank's interventions in SubSaharan Africa (Harrison 2004) , Harrison (2005, 241-42) concluded that the Bank has a liberal worldview, which it has imposed on African states in promoting governance reforms through its interventions-lending and technical assistance. It is worth noting that African states have been the subject of the bulk of Bank-funded governance reform. Harrison attributed this new liberal worldview, steeped in a combination of Western culture and history and American political thought, to shape the Bank's strategy of reducing the capacity and scope of the recipient state for public action (ibid.).
Harrison suggested that the World Bank theory of political change stems from the Bank's belief that those responsible for change in the recipient state act with rational choice, that the state should intervene as little as possible in the economy, that incentives for state agents will work, and that the state should act as a marketcomplementing institution (ibid., 245-46). He found this liberal-capitalist worldview at odds with the worldview and the theory of political change in Tanzania and Uganda, the countries he studies. Contrasting these divergent theories, he concluded that both the earlier class-based theory of the African state and the subsequent theory relying upon a network of clientelism based in ethnic-social relations are steeped in cultural traditions and history and are not comprehended by the Bank, which doggedly pursues governance reforms it considers appropriate. These prescribed reforms, he suggested, cannot succeed, for, although the African states make cosmetic changes in response to the Bank's demands, not much in fact changes (ibid., 251-56).
In a study released in May 2005, the World Bank presented the latest update of its aggregate governance indicators for 2004 for 209 countries and territories, designed to measure the following six dimensions of governance-voice and accountability, political stability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005) . The study documents that "there is little evidence of any trends-for better or worse-in global averages of governance" (ibid., 2). It argues that based upon existing evidence "most of the correlation between governance and per capita income reflects causation from the former to the latter," and that misgovernance in a country or region leads to low incomes (ibid., 3-4).
Based upon the past experience and current trends, for governance reforms to succeed, the history and culture of the recipient country matter the most and must be given top priority. The World Bank, in applying its own conceptualization of good governance and seemingly not showing enough sensitivity to these issues in the developing states, may not be able to succeed in achieving the results it seeks.
IMF and Good Governance
The IMF was established to act as a forum to facilitate international monetary cooperation and to regulate monetary relationships. However, the traditional IMF role as international coordinator and regulator on monetary issues among states came under heavy pressure because of a combination of the rise of capital flows and a breakdown of international exchange rate obligations. In the 1980s the number of developing countries seeking assistance grew, the World Bank/IMF intrusions into states' policies grew, and hence the number of SAPs became the norm and the scope of conditionality expanded. IFIs imposed severe austerity measures.
The IMF had initially gotten involved in capital account issues because of its role in addressing the debt crisis but subsequently began justifying conditionality under the rationale that in inducing capital flows and thus enhancing market confidence, it was acting as a catalyst (Thirkell-White 2003, 104; Dhonte 1997, 7 ; for a critical account, see Bird and Rowlands 1997) . During the late 1980s, a backlash began against the SAPs in developing countries, and by the mid-1990s according to one estimate, more than half of IMF programs were failing implementation (Killick 1995) .
Despite the research findings that conditionality does not work, its expansion during the course of the 1990s is striking, as the share of programs with structural conditions and the average number of conditions per program increased significantly during that period-programs with structural conditions increased from 60 to 100 percent from 1989 to 1999, and the average number of structural conditions per program increased from three to twelve (Santiso 2001, 10; Kapur and Webb 2000, 5-7) .
Two factors are primarily responsible for the Fund's governance agenda: "the rise of capital account openness and . . . the difficult political consequences of its adoption of structural adjustment in the 1980s" (Thirkell-White 2003, 105) . Those driving the agenda were financial technocrats-financial ministers and central bankers in developed as well as developing states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in developed states (ibid.). It was not, however, until 1997 that the IMF fully articulated its governance policy. Although the policy guidelines announced then were couched in economic terms, there were strong political undertones. After explicitly stating that the IMF should focus on the improvement and support of "the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory environment" (IMF 1997, para. 5) , the document provides the rationale for the Fund's concern with governance issues: "Poor governance would have a significant current or potential impact on macroeconomic performance in the short and medium term and on the ability of the government credibly to pursue policies aimed at external viability" (ibid., para. 9).
[F]or governance reforms to succeed, the history and culture of the recipient country matter the most and must be given top priority. Thirkell-White (2003) , who studied the IMF's response to the financial crises in the 1990s in Korea and Indonesia, criticized the Fund's governance policy as applied to middle-income countries on two grounds: first, the policy was being steered by the IMF's Executive Board with unbridled discretion to make decisions no longer controlled by a rules-based framework, and second, the decisions did not necessarily reflect the primacy of the needs or interests of those the IMF purported to help but rather of Western countries and Western NGOs that were far less affected by those decisions (pp. 120-21).
He argued that both economic and political forces are driving the Fund's governance. Financial technocrats in the Fund and the financial elites in government ministries and banks in the countries that the Fund assists lead the economic forces; and the liberal and democratic agenda is driven by political concerns and potentially addresses the criticism in the West that traditionally the Fund has been too narrowly focused on macroeconomic considerations in the formulation and implementation of its aid policies (ibid., 99-100).
As in the World Bank, there is tension between the Fund's economic and political governance agendas, especially when the Fund's goals on governance are not clearly defined and articulated. It should be noted that the Fund's economic governance agenda is concerned with traditional economic management and the political governance agenda is aimed at enhancing market confidence.
THE "GOOD GOVERNANCE" CONCEPT REVISITED
Thirkell-White raised a question of principle by suggesting that the Fund's major proposed reforms in Korea-enhancing corporate transparency, accountability, and competition; and disciplining and structuring the huge industrial conglomerates, the chaebols, to favor small business-cannot be justified as interventions in pursuance of the Fund's traditional technocratic and politically neutral mandate, even though at the heart of the crisis was the lack of market confidence. These were interventions dovetailing President Kim Dae Jung's political agenda, and the Korean people adopted them not as measures devised to enhance economic efficiency but to further nationalism and democracy (ibid., 108-12).
Similar was the case in Indonesia, which was suffering reversal of market confidence caused primarily by corruption and nepotism and poor governance by the Suharto regime. This had led to the financial crisis. The IMF's structural reform measures aimed at the prevalent corruption and bank mismanagement did not work. Subsequently, the Suharto government agreed to IMF prescriptions for governance reform, including new bankruptcy, consumer, and corporate governance laws, capital and current account liberalization, modification of several subsidies, ending cartels and monopolies, and independent audits of government departments and state-owned enterprises (Government of Indonesia 1998).
However, the program was not effectively implemented and hence did not succeed in establishing market confidence. According to some critics (Radelet and Sachs 1998) , the Fund should have directly addressed Indonesia's debt burden, which it failed to do initially. It did, however, belatedly take measures to provide the needed debt relief. Others saw the problem as mainly political (Haggard 2000) . IMF intervention, seeking to end corruption and nepotism, the main reasons for Suharto's downfall, could perhaps be seen as the Fund's positive role in Indonesia (Thirkell-White 2003, 116) . What is noteworthy is that on the economic front IMF's intervention in Indonesia was a failure. If the governance agenda brought about a political change in the government, however, questions then arise about the Fund's political authority to do so, and especially its decision-making mechanisms in striking a balance between democracy on one hand and markets and liberal economics on the other. It may be argued that without meaningful participation of the recipient country's political leadership, the Fund's decisions on macroeconomic management may not garner the political receptivity essential for the success of the Fund's governance agenda.
Thirkell-White's observation is apt:
Transparent administration sounds positive from a political point of view but, in the hands of economists, can slip from a means of accountability (transparency about decisionmaking procedures) to a requirement for "predictable" policy-making that takes away government discretion. The most benign form of that is central bank independence but the agenda rapidly broadens to include, for example, ideas like a fiscal constitution to limit government spending. Is transparency over country economic policy transparency for developing country citizens or a free source of data for the markets? Concern with the "rule of law" can similarly be subverted to outlaw land reform and ethnic redistribution of wealth or, with an economic focus, can divert judicial resources from grass roots justice to training judges for the commercial courts. (Ibid. 118) In a nutshell, unlike the Fund's current practice, decision making at the Fund about the direction of its governance agenda in each country must be responsive to the country's cultural and political traditions, preferences, and sensitivities.
The United States and Good Governance
The National Security Strategy of the United States, announced by President George W. Bush in September 2002, provides the rationale and the framework for new U.S. development assistance under a new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, sec. VII). Noting that massive development assistance has not resulted in economic growth in many countries and "has often served to prop up failed policies," the president said that the MCA is for projects in countries whose governments rule justly, invest in the people, and encourage economic freedom. Governments must fight corruption, respect basic human rights, embrace the rule of law, invest in health care and education, follow responsible economic policies, and enable entrepreneurship. The Millennium Challenge Account will reward countries that have demonstrated real policy change and challenge those that have not to implement reforms. (Ibid.) This policy statement has set the tone for U.S. aid agencies to opt for selectivity. In November 1998, the U.S. Agency for International Development's (U.S. AID) Center for Democracy and Governance provided a conceptual framework that recognized the importance of linkages between democratization and economic growth (Center for Democracy and Governance November 1998, 3). It identified four categories that describe the agency's democracy and governance activitiesrule of law, elections and political processes, civil society, and governance (ibid., 5). Noting that ultimately the process of governing is most legitimate "when it is infused with democratic principles such as transparency, pluralism, citizen involvement in decisionmaking, representation, and accountability," the center organized its governance work in five areas-democratic decentralization, legislative strengthening, government integrity, policy implementation, and civil-military relations (ibid., 19).
U.S. AID builds on the National Security Strategy statement to formulate and implement its development goals. In a January 2004 white paper on U.S. foreign aid, the agency noted that donors have learned lessons about aid effectiveness, including the following: "Allocate aid across and within countries more selectively," since "progress is primarily a function of commitment and political will to rule justly, promote economic freedom, and invest in people" (U.S. Foreign Aid 2004, 6) . It stated that it will work in a complementary fashion with another independent agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), "employing principles of selectivity based on commitment and performance in countries that can aspire to MCC eligibility or are good candidates for transformational development" (ibid; see also ibid., 20). U.S. AID has identified nine principles of development and reconstruction assistance to achieve development objectives including economic growth, democracy and governance, and social transition: ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and accountability (U.S. AID 2005b). The United States coordinates its international aid policies with major donor governments, regional organizations, and multilateral lending bodies including the World Bank (U.S. AID 2005a).
The MCC uses five of the six World Bank indicators-rule of law, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, control of corruption, and regulatory quality-as part of the set of sixteen indicators it uses to select countries to qualify to submit proposals for MCA funding (Radelet, Siddiqi, and Dizolele 2005) . A country must score better than the median score in its group in half of the indicators in each of three broad areas-ruling justly, investing in people, establishing economic freedom-to pass the indicators test, and must surpass the median on corruption as part of the "ruling justly" indicators (ibid., 2).
In a discussion on the future of the MCA in May 2005, the focus was on economic growth, donor ownership, and free markets (Center for Global Development 2005). There was consensus on linking assistance to performance, measuring results, monitoring and evaluation, and "ownership" as the direction taken by the MCA in the selection of the recipient countries. Experts also agreed that the country's commitment to change and its allocation of resources are important factors to assure effective use of aid in reducing poverty (ibid.).
Concluding Remarks
Conditionalities have not necessarily brought about policy reforms that are sustainable over the long term (Killick 1998; Gwin and Nelson 1997) . Based on the failure of conditionality in Africa, one critic argues that if it is pursued as a means of general economic policy making, conditionality is often "dysfunctional" because it implies a "transfer of sovereignty" that undermines the domestic political process (Collier 1999) . For reforms to succeed, domestic support, ownership, and commitment are crucial; otherwise, as a World Bank researcher has reported, development aid dependence had a negative impact during 1982 and 1995 on corruption, rule of law, and quality of governance (Knack 2000) .
It is difficult to implement selectivity for high levels of poverty and weak governance go together. As one critic has aptly stated, selectivity as a "form of ex-post conditionality should not penalize least developed countries by concentrating aid exclusively on good performers, most of which are middle-income countries. The poor in poorly performing countries already have to bear the burden of inept governments and authoritarian regimes" (ibid., 11).
Past performance cannot be an effective indicator and guide to future performance (Hansen and Tarp 2000) . For the success of governance reforms, the state and governing institutions must be reformed and strengthened; effective demo-cratic institutions established; and effective participation, strengthened accountability, and enhanced rule of law instituted to ensure sustainable good governance.
The good governance agenda of multilateral aid agencies and donor countries is being refined. Although it is impossible to have a clear-cut demarcation between economic and political aspects of governance, the current confusion and ambiguities need to be further clarified. Notwithstanding the lack of clarity about the concept, however, a reiteration of good governance and efforts at governance reforms, despite many pitfalls, have served a useful function in identifying the problem areas hampering the success of development aid. It bears reiterating that the concept can be used effectively only when the cultural context and history are understood and sensitively taken into account. Finally, without effective participation and meaningful ownership by the recipient government and the people in the recipient country, development aid cannot accomplish its objectives.
Notes

